What is the marginal effect of competitiveness on the power of electoral incentives? Addressing this question empirically is difficult because challenges to incumbents are endogenous to their behavior in office. To overcome this obstacle, we exploit a unique feature of Kansas courts: fourteen districts employ partisan elections to select judges, while seventeen employ noncompetitive retention elections. In the latter, therefore, challengers are ruled out. We find judges in partisan systems sentence more severely than those in retention systems. Additional tests attribute this to the incentive effects of potential competition, rather than the selection of more punitive judges in partisan districts. * This is the latest in a series of joint papers by the authors; the ordering of names reflects a principle of rotation. We thank
Introduction
In empirical studies of the agency relationship between voters and elected officials, it has been well established that the behavior of the latter seems in many cases to conform to the demands of the former (e.g. Besley and Coate 2003; Bartels 1991; Miller and Stokes 1963) . This conformity has been explained with reference to the success of voters at selecting likeminded officials and by the incentive effects of periodic review. To the extent that incumbents alter their behavior in anticipation of possible sanction at the polls, a puzzle emerges: To what extent does the competitiveness of the electoral environment increase the power of these incentives? This question has taken on particular importance in the American political context, where public officials in numerous positions frequently run for reelection unopposed or face only token opposition (Cox and Katz 1996) .
The absence of serious challengers may be said to contribute to an erosion of democratic accountability. At the same time, however, this absence (and the resulting lopsided margins by which incumbents often retain office) may reflect incumbent compliance with public demands rather than autonomy from them. In addition to serving as alternatives for voters, serious challengers in competitive elections can audit incumbents and provide information to voters about the qualifications of incumbents or their behavior in office. The mere threat that a challenger could play these roles might be sufficient to alter incumbent behavior. Such a response would deny challengers a strong case to make to voters for the incumbent's replacement, or deter them from running altogether. In this regard, the potential for competition could improve incumbent compliance because of the role that challengers might play, but, in the vast majority of circumstances, never get the chance to.
A central empirical implication of this argument is that incumbents should be more responsive to public demands when the potential for electoral competition is higher. Unfortunately, isolating the effect of competitiveness empirically is difficult because challenger viability -whether in primary or general election contests -is itself endogenous to incumbent performance. In other words, the spirited electoral contests that officeholders fear are the very ones in which a challenger has a case to make to voters about an incumbent's failures.
To overcome this problem, we rely on a unique feature of district court judicial elections in Kansas. There, fourteen judicial districts employ partisan competitive elections to select judges, while seventeen employ gubernatorial appointment and non-competitive retention elections. The retention districts provide an appropriate baseline of comparison: Although judges in those districts must face the voters, by law, there can be no challengers. Comparing officials in a single state permits us to hold constant numerous potential confounding factors, most importantly the legal environment in which those officials operate.
We derive predictions concerning the relationship between the sentencing behavior of incumbent judges and the electoral system in which they operate. Employing data on felony convictions in Kansas and several econometric approaches, we demonstrate that judges in partisan competitive systems sentence significantly more punitively than those in retention systems. Our identification strategy subsequently exploits variation in judges' electoral calendars to demonstrate that the effect of the electoral system is more pronounced in altering judges' incentives than in changing who is selected to office. Our findings demonstrate that the potential for competition from challengers substantially enhances incumbent attention to voter demands, while providing insight into both the functioning of electoral systems generally and the operation of the criminal justice system in particular.
2 Elections, Accountability, and the Role of Challengers
Selection and Incentives
Broadly speaking, there are two mechanisms by which elections might produce faithful representation on the part of elected officials. The first is selection. Ideally, competitive elections allow voters to choose candidates whose preferences most closely mirror their own (Downs 1957; Fearon 1999 ).
In the selection account, the presence of challengers facilitates a closer match between voters and their representatives through the provision of alternatives. The second mechanism is the incentive effect of elections (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986 ). Even those incumbents who do not share their constituents' preferences or possess strong qualifications may nonetheless behave faithfully or work hard if their failure to do so will result in their subsequent punishment at the polls. 1
The Functions of Challengers
The threat a challenger poses to an incumbent plays a critical role in structuring incumbent incentives. If voter preferences are heterogeneous, the presence of an additional choice on the ballot may be sufficient to reduce the vote share of an incumbent with an otherwise strong reputation.
Challengers also play an informational role in elections. They are strongly motivated to audit incumbent performance and, when possible, publicize actual or perceived missteps (Arnold 1993) .
In this respect, challengers play a "fire alarm" role (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) , monitoring incumbents on behalf of voters and reporting evidence of shirking. This role complements the informational function of the media, constituency groups, and grassroots organizations, as attention to incumbent behavior is far more intense during competitive electoral contests (Arnold 2004; Alvarez 1997 ). If entering a race entails opportunity costs for a challenger, the very fact that he or she has stepped into the ring may signal to voters that the incumbent is deficient in some regard (Gordon, Huber, and Landa forthcoming) .
What should we expect to observe if incumbents alter their behavior in anticipation of this threat? First, we should frequently see races lacking a viable challenger. Viability is often a consequence of the incumbent's vulnerability, which he or she will take pains to minimize. 2 In the absence of viable challengers, incumbents should secure reelection by wide margins. Second, we should expect voters to be ignorant much of the time, because their knowledge of incumbent behavior is endogenous to campaigning by challengers (and the subsequent attention paid by the media).
In light of these difficulties, efforts to ascertain the incentive effect of electoral competition using data on voter knowledge and election outcomes will likely suffer from simultaneity bias.
One might posit, for example, that a relationship between competition and compliance implies that unpopular decisions by elected officials will tempt challengers to enter a race, lowering an incumbent's vote share (cf. Brady, Canes-Wrone, and Cogan 2002) . However, incumbents who make unpopular decisions may perceive themselves to be safe from effective challenges for reasons the analyst cannot observe. Similarly, one could argue that low levels of voter knowledge ought to be associated with greater incumbent noncompliance because voter ignorance allows incumbents to make choices without electoral implications. However, low levels of voter knowledge or attentiveness may be a consequence of incumbent compliance with voter demands and its deterrent effect on challenger entry, rather than a cause of noncompliance.
A more promising direction is to examine the behavior of incumbents. In particular, incumbents should alter their behavior given the threat of real electoral competition more than they would in its absence. Moving toward an empirical test of this prediction requires surmounting two obstacles. First, we require a measure of the extent of incumbent compliance with public demands.
Second, to overcome the endogeneity of challenger viability, we require an exogenous determinant of the potential threat of electoral competition.
The Case of Judicial Elections
Examining the behavior of trial judges is an especially useful means for understanding the connection between electoral institutions and the behavior of public officials. Examining the behavior of Kansas trial court judges in particular provides a unique opportunity to understand the specific effects of electoral competitiveness.
The behavior of elected trial judges. Trial judges must face periodic review by voters in 39 American states. Examining their behavior, as opposed to that of other elected officials, confers three immediate advantages. First, we can employ the sentences sanctioned by judges in individual criminal cases to obtain a direct measure of action that is comparable across officials and different institutional contexts. Owing to reporting requirements, data on sentencing is often accompanied by an enormous volume of information about specific conditions under which sentences were handed down. This makes it possible to account for much of the natural heterogeneity of circumstances judges confront when making decisions.
Second, voters tend to know next to nothing about judges' decisions in the vast majority of cases (Mathias 1990; Sheldon and Lovrich 1983) . To the extent that very low levels of voter knowledge enhance opportunities for incumbent autonomy, the study of elected judges comprises a difficult case for testing general theories of electoral accountability.
Third, on the rare occasion that voters do become aware of judicial behavior, it is usually due to coverage of high-profile trials or controversial cases of recidivism. Critically, adverse publicity nearly always corresponds to cases of perceived judicial leniency. Media accounts of courtroom proceedings tend to result in voters believing judges are too lenient (Roberts and Edwards 1989) .
Additionally, voters are inclined to believe the criminal justice system as a whole is too lenient (Warr 1995) . Finally, nearly all convicts claim to have been punished too much, and more definitive evidence of overpunishment typically comes to light years after a judge hands down a sentence. 3
By contrast, an episode of recidivism or unusually pointed criticism of a judge by a victims' rights group or police union (or challenger) provides a more immediate signal that a judge's sentence did not fit the crime.
An informational environment in which judges have greater reason to fear voters perceiving them as too lenient than too severe (if they perceive judges at all) creates an asymmetry: If the constraint of public opinion binds at all, it will tend to make judges weakly more punitive rather than more moderate with respect to constituent preferences (Huber and Gordon 2004 ). This asymmetry is reinforced by an important feature of the trial judge's institutional environment: sentencing guideline regimes and statutory maximum penalties imply that those sentences a typical voter might perceive as "too harsh" often fall outside the range of the judge's discretion. 4
The (weak) unidirectionality of the electoral incentive is valuable because it eliminates the need for the analyst to determine which direction (more lenient or harsh) engenders greater compliance with public demands for a particular judge, a difficulty that besets the analysis of legislative behavior (but see Lee, Moretti, and Butler 2004) . 5 This is critical because in general we will not be able to obtain a measure of a judge's primitive sentencing preferences apart from those induced by his or her political environment.
Kansas judicial selection as a natural experiment. There are 31 judicial districts in Kansas, each composed of from one to seven of the state's 105 counties. Incumbent judges occupy unique seats (called "divisions"), and are therefore not in direct competition with one another.
3 Moreover, even evidence of wrongful prosecution or juror error attaches not to the sentencing judge, but rather to those who fabricated evidence or misjudged its veracity.
4 Whereas all crimes have mandatory maximum penalties, not all have mandatory minima. In many states (including Kansas, the subject of our analysis below), guideline minimum sentences may be broached if the judge determines the presence of exculpatory factors.
5 In the context of sentencing, the bidirectionality problem is most likely to emerge given voter evaluation of sentences for so-called "victimless crimes" such as drug possession. Accordingly, we exclude sentences for such crimes in our analysis below.
Judges in all districts serve staggered four year terms, with elections occurring in even years.
Kansas is one of two states in which the method of selecting judges differs from district to district.
Since 1974, subject to approval in a district-wide referendum, individual districts can choose to replace the default system of selecting judges via partisan competitive elections with a system of gubernatorial appointment and non-competitive retention elections.
A brief history of the adoption process is warranted. A 1972 amendment to the state constitution authorized the legislature to codify procedures for districts to choose between the two selection methods. Once those procedures were in place, each existing judicial district voted on its own selection method in 1974. That year, 23 of the 29 districts switched to retention elections.
Since then, in order to place the issue of judicial selection system on the general election ballot, supporters must present a petition signed by more of a district's voters than 5% of the number who voted in the preceding secretary of state election. Since 1984, a statutory provision prohibits a district from returning to this question more than once every seven years.
By 1984, eight of the districts that initially switched to retention had returned to the partisan method (and two new retention districts were created out of counties in existing ones). Three additional districts voted to keep the retention system, although one subsequently returned to the partisan method. In 1986, the district encompassing Kansas City unsuccessfully voted to shift back to the retention system it had narrowly abandoned in 1980, while two other districts (one containing Topeka, and the other a northern suburb of Kansas City) failed to shift from retention to the partisan method in 2000. Since then, no additional measures have been considered, although some groups have pressed to eliminate one option or the other altogether (Sanders 1995; Kansas Citizens Justice Initiative 1999; Ventimiglia 2006) . The most recent observed vote in favor of the retention method ranges from 26% to 68%, with a mean of about 50%. 6
In districts employing the partisan selection method, judges seek their party's nomination in primaries held in August. 7 The victors then face off in a general contest on Election Day 6 Source: State of Kansas, Election Statistics: Primary and General Elections. Because districts were reorganized between 1974 and 2006, we identified the most recent vote on selections systems in each county during this period, and then aggregated these data by contemporary judicial districts to calculate these percentages. Reweighting the county level data to adjust for shifts in relative population produces highly similar figures.
7 The partisan primaries are closed to members of the opposite party, although the Democratic primary is open to unaffiliated voters. in November. 8 In retention districts, a nominating commission in each proposes names to the governor. 9 If she chooses to appoint a nominee, that judge will serve a one-year probationary term followed by a retention vote. 10 If retained, the judge will stand for retention every four years thereafter. In a retention election, the judge's name appears on the ballot, and voters can vote Other empirical contexts in which these comparisons might be made are problematic. One could, for example, consider comparing judicial sentencing behavior across states with different selection methods. Even if one could adequately control for the contextual and institutional het- 8 We compiled data on the 138 contests in partisan competitive districts involving an incumbent trial judge from 1994 to 2002 (source: Kansas Secretary of State). Nine incumbents faced challengers in primary elections (three lost) and ten did so in general elections (one lost). As we noted above, because challenger entry is endogenous to incumbent performance, these numbers by themselves do not indicate an effect on incumbent accountability, although they do reveal that incumbent judges can be defeated.
9 Commissions are each composed of an equal number of attorneys and no attorneys. Attorney members are elected by their peers; others are appointed by Boards of County Commissioners.
10 In the absence of an appointment, the seat remains open.
11 From 1994 to 2002, 144 judges stood for retention election; none lost his or her seat. The average Yes vote for incumbent judges was 76% (with a standard deviation of 5%) and the minimum was 51%. erogeneity across states, however, fundamental differences in legal systems would remain difficult to account for. Criminal codes vary enormously in how they categorize crimes, and judges in different states have vastly different discretion in punishing offenders. By confining our analysis to a single state, we can hold constant the legal system under which judges (as well as prosecutors, defense attorneys, and defendants) operate.
Another possibility is to examine the behavior of officials in another state. For example, Missouri has a similarly bifurcated system of selecting judges. However, Missouri adopted nonpartisan selection of circuit court judges only in urban areas (Kansas City and St. Louis) on the heels of charges that urban political machines were exercising undue influence in the selection process (Watson and Downing 1969) . The effect of the selection mechanism in Missouri is therefore not separable from numerous other differences between urban and rural counties. Such confounding influences are likely to be minimal in the Kansas setting. Two of the four most urban counties in the state (Wyandotte and Sedgwick) select district judges via partisan races, while the other two (Shawnee and Johnson) employ a retention system. Rural counties are similarly split.
To determine whether the institutional variable is a proxy for other features of judges' environments (e.g. voter preferences, engagement, or attentiveness), we gathered data on the political and demographic characteristics of Kansas' 31 judicial districts. We then compared the characteristics of the partisan competitive and retention districts using t-tests of equality of means and bootstrapped Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of equality of distributions. The first two columns of Table   1 report the associated p-values. District crime rate is one of two variables for which substantial imbalance exists between the two systems -retention districts have significantly higher crime rates, a result largely driven by Shawnee County (the location of Topeka). The other variable is the average support for Kansas Supreme Court justices in their retention elections, which could conceivably proxy citizen mistrust of the judicial system. This imbalance appears because of very low support for incumbent Supreme Court judges in Districts 4 and 11. 
Identification Strategy
In Appendix A, we present a simple heuristic model to clarify the intuition underlying the incentive effect of potential competitiveness on elected judges. We anticipate that, ceteris paribus, incumbent judges in Kansas's partisan competitive districts will sentence more punitively than judges in its retention districts. While consistent with an incentive effect, such a finding would also be consistent with a selection account: voters in partisan districts may select inherently more punitive judges than judicial nominating commissions do in retention districts. Alternatively, voters in partisan districts may elect district attorneys more punitive than voters in retention districts do.
Addressing the concern about differences in elected prosecutors is straightforward and is discussed in greater detail below. Our strategy for identifying the incentive effect of potential competitiveness, and for eliminating rival interpretations for that effect, proceeds in several phases. The first two aim to ensure that the distinction between electoral systems is not merely a proxy for other features of districts that may contribute to differences in sentencing. Phase one is regressionbased: we consider whether the estimated effect of the electoral system is sensitive to the inclusion of observable district characteristics, including the crime rate and electoral support for incumbent Supreme Court judges, in a saturated model of sentencing behavior.
Phase two relaxes the parametric assumptions of regression in a matching analysis. We compare outcomes from similar criminal cases drawn from matched pairs of observably similar judicial districts with different electoral systems. This approach discards data from retention districts that are not comparable to those that employ the competitive system. We then conduct an additional matching analysis restricting our attention to districts for which the most recent referendum on selection mechanism was "close" (defined below). The intuition behind this approach (see Lee forthcoming) is that districts where support is near-even are those in which random factors affecting turnout (which is quite low for these referenda) will tend to play a prominent role relative to underlying voter preferences, thereby more closely approximating a randomized experiment.
Of course, the possibility still remains that the incentive effect of the electoral system is confounded by an unobservable tendency of partisan competitive districts to select inherently more punitive judges. Our strategy for disentangling these competing explanations for differences in judicial behavior (Phase three) exploits variation in behavior over judges' electoral calendars. If elected judges discount the future value of holding office relative to the benefit of assigning their most preferred sentences, then an incentive-based account predicts that judges will sentence weakly more punitively as election approaches, controlling for secular trends in sentencing. We refer to this phenomenon as the electoral "proximity effect." 12 A pure selection account, by contrast, is incompatible with the dynamic adjustment implied by a significant proximity effect.
More importantly, considering the nature of the interaction between electoral rules and electoral proximity sheds additional light on how judges' incentives operate. Suppose that electoral incentives were comparable under both selection methods, but that voters in partisan competitive districts tended to select judges who were inherently more punitive than those selected by nominating commissions in retention districts. We should then anticipate the electoral proximity effect to be smaller in the competitive districts than the noncompetitive ones. The intuition is as follows: at any given point on the electoral calendar, retention judges would sentence more leniently on average than partisan judges. Given diminishing electoral returns to sentencing harshly, the marginal electoral benefit to a retention judge of increasing her sentence would be larger. As election drew closer, the retention judge would therefore respond to a shift in her priorities toward accommodating electoral pressure with larger increases in sentencing than would a partisan judge.
By contrast, suppose judges did not differ much in their innate sentencing preferences across selection systems, but that partisan competitive incumbents were instead responding to the threat of a viable challenger with more punitive sentences. This account is consistent with either a smaller or larger proximity effect in partisan competitive districts than in retention districts. Judges in partisan competitive systems are more likely to be constrained by statutory or guideline maximum sentences earlier in their terms than their retention system counterparts. Consequently, situations may arise in which a partisan judge's sentencing is unresponsive to electoral proximity whereas a retention judge's sentencing continues to increase over the course of her term. Unconstrained 12 For two reasons, it is appropriate to view electoral proximity as exogenous to judicial decision making. First, pursuant to Rule 107 of the Kansas Supreme Court, trial court cases must be apportioned "as equally as possible" among judges within a district, and judges cannot refuse cases except in instances of clear conflicts of interest. The practical effect of this rule has been the adoption of random or near-random assignment of cases across judges within the districts. Consequently, judges cannot "cherry pick" cases they expect to be politically uncontroversial, nor can prosecutors or defense attorneys cherry pick judges on the basis of their electoral proximity. Second, the electoral calendar is fixed, so judges cannot call early elections to capitalize on popular decisions. partisan judges, however, face higher marginal electoral benefits from sentencing harshly at any given point in their electoral calendars (to avoid the threat of a viable challenger); consequently, as election draws closer (and electoral benefits weigh more heavily in their decision calculus), partisan competitive judges would respond with larger increases in sentencing than their retention counterparts.
To summarize the third phase of our strategy: (1) A finding that at least some judges become more punitive as election approaches is consistent with an account based on electoral incentives and not selection alone; (2) A finding that this electoral proximity effect is greater in retention districts than partisan competitive districts is consistent with both the challenger-based incentive mechanism and the alternative, selection-based account; (3) A finding that the proximity effect is greater in partisan competitive districts than retention districts is consistent with the challengerbased incentive mechanism but not the selection account.
Data and Method

Sentencing in Kansas
We obtained data on the sentencing behavior of 160 Kansas district court judges from 1997 to 2003. Seventy-three judges served in districts with partisan competitive elections, and eighty-seven in districts with retention elections. 13 Criminal sentencing in Kansas is governed by the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act of 1993 as amended (hereafter, the guidelines), which places limits on the discretion of trial court judges in assigning sentences to convicted offenders. Convicts serve at least 85% of the sentence a judge hands down before becoming eligible for parole. As with most guideline systems, judges are required to take into account an offender's criminal history and the severity of the offense committed to determine an applicable range of appropriate sentences. Judges then have limited discretion to depart from the recommended range.
Although the guidelines suggest a single, presumptive sentence for history/severity combinations, judges can generally choose to assign any sentence between the minimum and maximum guideline sentences without further justification. If a judge wishes to "upwardly depart," he or she may assign a sentence up to twice the guideline maximum given one or more aggravating circumstances specified in the statute. 14 He or she may also assign a departure sentence below the minimum sentence given mitigating circumstances. 15 Departure sentences are subject to appellate review and will be sustained if there are "substantial and compelling reasons for the departure." 16
In multiple count convictions, judges have discretion to assign sentences on less severe counts to run either concurrently or consecutively to the first sentence with the condition that the total time in prison cannot exceed twice the sentence on the primary count.
The dataset for our analysis was created by merging information about Kansas's judges and judicial districts with records of the sentences they assigned to individual defendants collected by the Kansas Sentencing Commission. We restricted our analysis to those felonies for which there were a reasonable number of cases across the state (more than 250), for which judges have discretion in sentencing, and for which incarceration is a possibility. This left us with a range of person (assault, criminal threat, robbery, sexual assault) and property crimes (theft, burglary, arson). 17 We have 18,141 cases for the period between July 1, 1997 and June 30, 2003. 18 The vast majority of cases were resolved via plea bargain. This is similar to the situation in most states, and does not threaten our ability to make inferences about judges' incentives. A judge's optimal sentence (discounted by the probability of a conviction) is properly viewed as a reversion or threat point in the negotiation between the prosecutor and defendant. Also, judges in Kansas have the discretion to reject settlements between prosecutors and defendants. 19 Because bargaining takes place in the shadow of the judge (LaCasse and Payne 1999), it incorporates the judge's underlying preferences about punishment. 20 Observed sentences range from zero to 3,185 months. In 69% of cases, the sentence includes probation, a fine, or community service, but no time in prison. For the remaining 31% of cases, the median prison sentence is 32 months. The number of counts in a conviction ranges from one to 50. 74% of cases have only a single count, and 99% have five or fewer counts.
A cursory examination of the data reveals preliminary support for the hypothesis that sentencing in partisan competitive districts is more severe than in retention districts. 35% of sentences handed down in the competitive districts include prison terms, compared with 27% in the retention jurisdictions. Likewise, the median non-zero prison sentence is higher in the partisan than retention districts -33 versus 31 months. The respective average non-zero prison terms are 66 and 57 months. All of these differences are highly statistically significant.
Case-level Covariates
A downside to a simple description of mean differences in sentencing outcomes is that this approach does not account for other relevant distinctions among cases. Fortunately, we have numerous variables to account for contextual heterogeneity in sentencing. Summary statistics for model variables appear in Table 2 . Our primary measure of culpability is the natural log of the presumptive sentence (plus one, to match the scaling of the dependent variable) associated with the conviction's top count. This captures the extent to which the state's elected officials view that criminal act by a defendant with a particular criminal history as harmful. We also include two indicator variables to control for revisions to the guidelines that occurred in 1996 and 1999. 21 Because judges have discretion to sentence additional counts concurrently or consecutively (subject to constraints discussed above), we also control for the number of additional counts in the conviction. Aggravating factors 19 Note that the fact that judges rarely reject plea bargains is not evidence against a judge's influence in the process; if attorneys correctly anticipate what a judge will accept, we should never observe plea bargains rejected.
20 Confirming the judge's importance, we find substantial variation in sentencing practices in districts with multiple judges but only one district attorney.
21 Earlier guideline regimes are relevant because the applicable guidelines are those in place at the time of the felony, not the sentencing. the judge is obliged to take into account include whether the defendant is a classified persistent sex offender, whether he or she was in possession of a firearm at the time of the crime, and whether the victim was a child, government employee, or law enforcement official.
Table 2 about here
We also include crime-specific indicator variables to account for heterogeneity in sentences, and year-specific effects to capture non-monotone secular trends in perceptions of criminal culpability.
These latter controls are also vital because we wish to account for the confounding effect of the prosecutor's electoral calendar. All district attorneys in Kansas are on the same four year electoral calendar, but judges within a district serve staggered terms. Year effects therefore control for changes in sentencing that might result from variation over time in prosecutors' electoral incentives.
In our analysis of the judge's electoral proximity effect, we can also account for average differences in district attorneys' offices through the inclusion of judge-specific fixed effects. These span all timeinvariant features of the district (including, for example, the culture in the prosecutor's office).
Variables affecting punitiveness consist of defendant-, case-, and judge-specific characteristics.
Included in the model are indicators of whether the sentence resulted from a plea bargain and whether the defendant had appointed counsel. We also include measures representing whether the defendant was male, nonwhite, or Hispanic. We control for defendant age and age-squared (under the hypothesis that judges are likely to be lenient toward both the youngest and oldest defendants).
An indicator variable equals one if the judge serves in a partisan competitive district, and zero if in a retention district. (Our measure of electoral proximity is discussed below.)
Results
The Baseline Systemic Effect
Our first set of estimates concerns the baseline hypothesis: Ceteris paribus, judges should behave more punitively in partisan competitive districts than in retention districts. We first present the results of our regression estimation, and then proceed to the matching analysis.
Regression Analysis. Our regression analysis relies on two substantive assumptions. First, all judges, no matter how lenient, adhere to the principle of proportionality: greater culpabil-ity demands greater punishment. Second, from the perspective of the defendant, the worst nonincarcerative sentence is preferable to the most lenient prison term. In Appendix B, we demonstrate how these assumptions, coupled with the right-censoring implied by statutory maximum sentences, yield the two-limit Tobit likelihood function (with an adjustment for judge-specific groupwise heteroscedasticity). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the prison term, in months, plus an unidentified constant. We adopt the common practice of setting the constant to one.
This normalization implies that one month in prison is exactly twice as painful as the worst nonincarcerative punishment. (We experimented with a broad range of alternative values, none of which affected our results.) Finally, note that a left-censored observation corresponding to zero prison time does not stand in for an unobserved "negative" sentence. All convicted felons are punished, but many are punished with a sentence less severe than prison.
First, we estimated four Tobit models, the coefficient estimates from which appear in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 of Table 3 . Specifications (1) and (2) employ all observations. Specifications (4) and (5) restrict the sample to all cases from retention districts plus cases from competitive districts in which the judge faced no competition in the subsequent election. Restricting the sample in this way is meant to capture the notion that it is the potential for challenger entry, rather than the fact of a challenge, that motivates changes in the behavior of incumbents. Models (2) and (5) include aggregate district-level measures in addition to case-and defendant-level factors.
Table 3 about here
We note a large number of significant predictors of punishment. The presumptive sentence and additional counts on the conviction have very strong positive effects, as expected, as do the aggravating factors. Also as expected, the presence of appointed (rather than privately-hired) counsel raises the expected length of incarceration while a plea bargain lowers it. We further find that nonwhites and Hispanics tend to receive larger punishments, even controlling for the legally relevant characteristics of individual cases. These findings, while troubling, are beyond the scope of the current analysis.
The column (2) and (5) specifications with district-level measures suggests more stringent sentences in districts with larger nonwhite populations and higher turnout and crime rates. Finally, likelihood ratio tests for all specifications allow us overwhelmingly to reject the null hypothesis that the year-specific indicator variables are jointly insignificant.
Next, we turn to the effect of potential electoral competition. In the four specifications discussed above, as expected, the coefficient on the partisan competitive district indicator is positive and highly statistically significant. Note that restricting our sample to judges who were subsequently unchallenged does not substantially alter the estimated effect of competitiveness. This suggests that the results are not driven by the behavior of judges who, ex ante, perceive themselves as particularly vulnerable.
Because the magnitude of Tobit coefficients can be difficult to interpret, we derived several quantities of greater substantive interest. This entailed setting all control variables at their sample medians (for district characteristics, we employ the district medians), and employing the modal crime (burglary) and year (2001). Our findings suggest estimated differences in the probability of an assigned prison term between partisan competitive and retention districts of 2.81% and 4.01%, depending on specification. These numbers may seem small at first, but one must keep in mind that the baseline probability of incarceration with the control variables set in this way is approximately 17% to 18% (depending on specification). The proportionate increase in the probability of incarceration associated with a change in the electoral rules is therefore about 16% to 23%, depending on specification.
Next, we calculated the change in the expected sentence given prison assignment (a more meaningful quantity than the change in unconditional expected prison time). Here, we set the value of the logged presumptive sentence equal to its median among observations for which prison was imposed. We find that the presence of a potential challenger increases the expected non-zero sentence by about 2.5 to 3.7 months, which represents a 7.8% to 11.6% increase over the median non-zero prison sentence in a retention district (32 months).
While our dataset includes thousands of case-level observations, it would be erroneous to assume that these observations are independent. We employ two approaches to test the sensitivity of our results to violations of independence. The first is to cluster observations by group in calculating the covariance matrix of our coefficient estimates. The standard errors reported in Table 3 are clustered at the judge level. We also derived standard errors clustering at the judge-year, districtyear, and district levels. Regardless of the level at which the dependence is assumed to exist, we can always reject the null hypothesis at a p-value of 0.03 or smaller (one-tailed test).
The clustering approach requires assuming that the number of groups approaches infinity, which may not be merited if dependence among observations operates at the district level. As an additional robustness check, we therefore employed the two-step approach advocated by Wooldridge (2006, (19) (20) : First, estimate the Tobit specifications in columns (1) and (4), substituting a vector of district-specific effects for the partisan selection indicator. Second, using weighted least squares, regress the coefficient estimates for the district effects on the district-level measures, including the selection method. (The weighting matrix has for its diagonal elements the ratio of the number of observations specific to each district to the variance of the first-stage district effect estimate.)
Estimates for the second stage regressions appear in columns (3) and (6) of Table 3 . In both specifications, the effect of the partisan selection method on the conditional district mean is positive and statistically significant at above the 95% level.
Matching. The Tobit models, while theoretically motivated, require strong functional form assumptions (e.g. linearity in variables). To ensure these do not drive our results, we also analyzed the data using a more flexible approach: nearest neighbor, one-to-one matching. 22 Matching proceeds by pairing observations from treatment (partisan competitive) and control (retention) groups that are similar in terms of their observed covariates, and comparing the outcomes (incarceration).
In the current application, the wealth of data permit us to obtain exact matches -and thus perfect balance -in treatment and control groups on all discrete case, defendant, and crime characteristics listed above. Given a group of exact matches, we pair observations closest in defendant age. 23 Estimates for the matching analysis are displayed in Table 4 . The table displays estimates of average treatment effects on the treated (ATT), i.e. the estimated effect of the electoral system on sentences administered in partisan competitive districts. 24 For the ATT estimates in columns (1) and (2), we make no effort to achieve balance on district-level observables. A case with a particular fact pattern from a partisan competitive district may be matched with one with the same fact pattern from any of the seventeen retention districts. The first row of estimates reports ATT estimates of changes in the probability of incarceration. The highly statistically significant 22 Matching was conducted using Sekhon's (2006) Match algorithm in R. 23 When necessary, we employ a caliper to insure balance on age. The p-values for bootstrapped Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of equality of distributions after matching range from 0.23 to 0.93.
24 ATT estimates permit superior balance on covariates not exactly matched on (particularly at the district level -see below), but are comparable to average treatment effect (ATE) estimates.
3.6% to 3.8% increase confirms the Tobit results.
Table 4 about here
The parametric assumptions underlying the Tobit specification permitted us to calculate the expected change in incarceration given a prison sentence was imposed. The matching algorithm does not permit us to derive a comparable figure without additional assumptions; however, by pooling both prison and non-prison sentences, we can estimate the average treatment effect in months across all observations. The expected shift -quite small because of the large number of sentences with no prison time -is a still statistically significant 0.554 or 0.551 months, depending on whether subsequently challenged judges are included.
Our ability to exactly match on discrete case factors stems from the fact that there are 1,134 unique fact pattern "clusters" in the sentencing data for which we possess observations from both treatment and control groups. Distance matching on defendant age within each cluster without concern of ties is expedited by the presence in the data of defendant birthdays, which allow us to measure this characteristic to the day. Matching observations on the basis of district-level variables is more complicated, owing to the presence of just 31 unique values for each measure.
This essentially guarantees the district-level covariates will not be balanced between treatment and control groups at the case level, even if excellent balance can be achieved at the district level. We therefore adopt a two-step approach. First, using the genetic matching algorithm of Diamond and Post-matching balance statistics at the district level appear in the third and fourth columns of Table 1 . Note that this technique enables us to achieve balance on the crime rate and Supreme Court retention vote, both of which were significantly unbalanced in the raw district-level data.
Having matched comparable districts, we then search for unique fact pattern clusters in district pairs, matching observations closest in age as above.
Results from the analysis with district matching appear in the third and fourth columns of Table 4 . The district matching technique discards a large volume of sentencing information, drawing cases from only seven of the seventeen retention districts to assure comparability. For example, only one of the five southeastern retention districts (6) is kept. Shawnee County, with its unusually high crime rate, is discarded, as are districts 4 and 11, owing to their unusually low Supreme Court retention votes. This approach dramatically decreases the overall sample size compared to matching on case-level covariates only. However, as the table indicates, adopting the more conservative approach significantly increases the magnitude of the estimated effects, which remain highly statistically significant. This again confirms our basic result: cases with observably identical fact patterns and defendant characteristics are more likely to result in stiffer penalties in districts where the threat of electoral competition looms over the judge.
Our final matching analysis restricts attention to the nineteen districts for which the most recent referenda on judicial selection were within ten percentage points of 50%, to reduce the likelihood that systematic but unobservable differences between the voters in partisan and retention districts are driving our results. Results appear in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 4 , and are similar in magnitude and statistical significance to those reported in the first two columns of the 
Exploiting Electoral Proximity to Evaluate Competing Mechanisms
The foregoing analysis has provided strong evidence that judges in partisan competitive districts are more punitive than those in retention districts. This finding is consistent with incumbent incentives generated by the potential informational role of challengers, but also, as discussed above, with a rival causal mechanism. As we note in Section II, however, a finding that judges in partisan competitive systems become more punitive as election draws closer while judges in retention systems do not would constitute empirical confirmation of the challenger-induced incentive account, and disconfirmation of the alternative.
Our measure of electoral proximity is a scale that increases linearly each day from zero, when a judge's next election is about four years away, up to one, when it is imminent. Because a judge in a 25 Limitations of data prevent using a range much narrower than 40-60%. If we narrow the range to 44-56%, the magnitude of our estimates is smaller, but they remain statistically significant at conventional levels. Narrowing the range to 47-53% leaves only one partisan competitive district (Sedgwick) from which to draw cases, and four more rural districts. For that range, our ATT estimate -which may be properly regarded as a Wichita-specific fixed effect -is negative. competitive district might not face a challenger in that year's primary and/or general election, some judges in competitive districts who are up for reelection cannot lose in that year. These judges learn they will be unchallenged when a statewide filing deadline passes in June of the election year. Our measure of electoral proximity therefore resets to zero if a judge in a competitive district learns she will be unchallenged (until at least the next election, about 4 years and 5 months later). 26 The measure resets similarly when a judge wins the general election (or wins the primary and is unchallenged in the general election). In either electoral system, judges who choose not to run again (do not file by the filing deadline) or who are defeated have electoral proximity scores of zero for the period between the relevant event and the end of their terms. 27 Table 5 provides empirical support for this prediction. We created interaction terms to estimate the effect of electoral proximity in each type of system. (This is equivalent to, although easier to interpret than, including the baseline effect of electoral proximity across districts, the partisan competitive indicator, and the interaction of electoral proximity and the partisan competitive indicator.) The specification in column (2) includes judge-specific fixed effects, which permit us to control for all time invariant characteristics of a judge's (and her district's) punitiveness -including those arising from differences among districts in the kinds of judges (and prosecutors) they tend to put on the bench. The fixed effects span the selection mechanism indicator variable and observable district-level characteristics, so those measures are omitted from the second specification.
26 While all judges must be concerned with being defeated in a fall election, those in competitive districts can avoid this risk altogether if they can deter potential challengers from entering the race by the June filing deadline. To account for this possibility, we have also coded an alternative measure of electoral proximity as a function which increases each day to one on the filing deadline. For all judges in competitive districts who run again and are challenged that year, proximity then remains at one until the day after their last competitive election (which they may win or lose). For comparability, judges in retention districts who run again are also assigned a proximity score of one from the filing deadline until the day after the general election. Coefficient estimates using this measure of proximity are statistically significant but about 10% smaller in absolute value than those reported in Table 5 below, a finding that is not surprising because this approach pools all sentencing between the filing deadline and the fall election as occurring under conditions of maximal electoral threat.
27 This approach assigns both judges who decide to retire and those whose next election is far in the future as having low electoral proximity scores. One might be concerned that the estimates of the relative effects of electoral proximity shown in Table 5 below arise because of differences between judges who seek to retain office and those who do not. However, excluding all sentences assigned by judges who chose not to run again increases the difference between electoral proximity in competitive and retention districts.
Table 5 about here
The primary variables of interest are the effect of selection system in (1) and the interaction between the institution and electoral proximity in both (1) and (2). The coefficient estimates for these variables confirm two important points. First, electoral proximity exerts a statistically significant pressure to become more punitive in the partisan competitive districts, but not in the retention districts. Holding the control variables at the same values discussed above, a shift from minimal proximity (e.g. the day after a filing deadline in which no challengers have filed) to maximal proximity (the days leading up to the general election in the presence of a challenger) in a competitive district leads to a statistically significant 3.4% increase in the probability of incarceration and, conditional on incarceration, a sentence 3.2 months longer. These effects are substantial, given that the baseline probability of incarceration is around 20% and the median sentence length in cases involving any incarceration is 32 months. Thus, these figures represents a 17% proportional increase in the probability a defendant is incarcerated and a 10% increase in sentence length. (The effects are even larger in the column [2] specification.) In noncompetitive districts, by contrast, an increase from minimal to maximal electoral threat produces a decrease in the probability of incarceration and sentence length, but in neither specification is that difference statistically distinguishable from zero.
Second, while the coefficient on the first-order partisan competitive indicator in specification (1) is positive, it is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Thus, while judges in competitive districts are always predicted to be more punitive than their counterparts in retention districts, the difference in their sentences exceeds estimation error at the 95% threshold only once a judge is about one-third of the way into her term. Finally, when election is imminent, judges in competitive districts are 7.1% (6.3% given the column [2] estimates) more likely to sentence a convict to time in prison and, conditional on incarceration, assign sentences 6.3 months longer than their counterparts in retention districts (5.6 per column [2] estimates). All of the differences given maximal electoral threat are highly statistically significant.
Some Remaining Confounding Influences Addressed
The battery of statistical tests described above suggest that our findings are robust to alternative specifications and incompatible with competing causal mechanisms. Here, we consider four remaining objections. First, one might object that merely controlling for the crime rate does not take into account variation in its effect on the behavior of public officials over the electoral cycle (Levitt 1997 ). This argument could be developed in two different ways. One might posit that a higher crime rate would lead all judges to raise their sentences as reelection nears in order to satisfy fearful voters. On the other hand, a high crime rate may itself be an artifact of a tendency by liberal judges to coddle criminals, and would therefore yield a smaller proximity effect than comparatively crime-free, conservative districts where punishment is non-controversial.
To address these arguments, we conducted two additional tests. We first re-estimated the model reported in Table 5 including the interaction between crime rate and electoral proximity, finding the results nearly unchanged. The electoral proximity coefficient is positive and statistically significant in competitive districts (and 17% larger than in Table 5 , column [1]) and indistinguishable from zero in retention districts. The estimates suggest no electorally-conditioned effect of crime rates on sentencing. We also re-estimated the earlier model specification dropping the observations from Shawnee County, which had a crime rate fully 34% higher than in the next most dangerous county. Again, the results are nearly unchanged (the coefficient on electoral proximity in competitive districts is 0.7% smaller than before).
A second and related argument is that controlling for Supreme Court judges' average retention vote share does not fully capture the dynamic effect, over the course of a judge's term, of voter mistrust of the judicial system. For example, if retention districts had lower levels of mistrust (higher retention vote shares), this might cause judges in those districts to worry less about sentencing too leniently toward the end of their terms, independent of the district's selection system. (Similarly, the effect of competitive elections might also appear inflated if those districts with partisan elections had higher levels of voter mistrust.) We therefore re-estimated the model reported in column (1) of Table 5 including the interaction between average retention vote share for incumbent Supreme Court justices and electoral proximity. Our basic results persist-over the course of their terms, judges in partisan districts become more punitive, while those in retention districts do not. 28
A third potential objection is that our results are driven by some intrinsic difference between urban and rural counties. At first glance this seems unlikely because (as we discuss above), the most urban counties are evenly split between retention and competitive systems. Further, in both our regression and matching analyses, we sought to mitigate this potential confounding influence.
Nonetheless, we reestimated the model reported in column (2) of Table 5 separately for the 5 most populous (and urban) districts and the remaining districts. While indications of statistical significance change slightly (in part due to the reduced sample size), we continue to find a larger proximity effect in competitive districts than in retention ones.
For the five largest districts, the proximity effect (in the specification with judge-specific fixed effects) is positive and statistically significant at p < 0.022 (one-tailed test) in the competitive districts and negative and statistically insignificant in retention districts. The estimates using the remaining districts display a familiar pattern, but the coefficient on proximity in the competitive district is significant only at p < .05 (one-tailed test). Nonetheless, we can reject the null hypotheses that the proximity coefficients are identical across selection systems at p < 0.01.
Finally, to ensure our results are not driven by peculiarities of particular districts, we reestimated the main specification 31 times, each time omitting a single district. In all thirty-one cases, the coefficient on electoral proximity is positive and significant (at p < .10, one-tailed test) in the competitive districts and negative in the retentions districts. The average difference between these coefficients is 0.56, with a standard deviation of 0.04. The minimum difference between coefficients is 0.48, about 14% smaller than the column (1) specification. In short, we have little reason to believe that these results are due to anything other than the difference in electoral incentives between competitive and retention districts.
Conclusion
Does the threat of a viable challenger in an election alter the behavior of elected officials and, by extension, the relationship between voters and those officials? This research provides strong evidence that it does. Competitive elections, and the attendant risk of a viable challenger, force 28 Employing a similar approach to test whether voter turnout is an alternative proxy for mistrust or superior citizen monitoring of judicial behavior yields nearly identical results. incumbent politicians to pay more heed to potential negative voter reactions to their behavior. With respect to this paper's specific object of empirical scrutiny, the risk of challenger entry induces trial judges elected in partisan competitive districts in Kansas to behave more punitively than their peers in that state's retention districts.
Potential challengers might alter incumbent behavior for different reasons. If they choose to run for office, their presence might serve to improve voters' selection of likeminded officials. On the other hand, as we have argued, challengers can also enhance the relationship between voters and incumbents by enhancing the power of electoral incentives. Through their implicit threat to inform voters about the malfeasance of incumbents, for example, challengers may deter that malfeasance in the first place. In our analysis, we find that the sentencing behavior of judges under partisan competitive selection rules is indistinguishable from that of judges under retention rules when election is a far-off prospect, but that the former become more punitive relative to the latter as the electoral threat grows closer. This constitutes empirical confirmation that the increase in the power of incentives caused by the threat of electoral competition dominates the selection effect.
We conclude with some informal observations about the normative implications of these results. The capacity to induce shifts in judicial behavior may not necessarily be an overriding goal in determining the appropriate selection mechanism for lower court judges -or any official for that matter (e.g. Maskin and Tirole 2004) . Pandering behavior by elected officials is especially problematic in the presence of severe information asymmetries between them and voters. In the case of trial judges, an impulse for consistency in treatment may produce a desire to eliminate institutions that can produce variation in sentencing over time. Likewise, arguments concerning the appropriate level of punishment for a particular crime may lead us to favor institutions that produce more or less anticipation and fear by incumbents of punishment at the polls. These are questions we cannot address here. We have sought instead to better identify and understand the extent to which electoral incentives can bind incumbent officials, whether for better or worse.
Appendix A. A Model of Judges' Preferred Sentences
Let p(s; q) be the probability a judge is reelected as a function of s ≥ 0, the imposed sentence, and q, a parameter denoting the sensitivity of negative electoral response to lenient sentencing. A judge's expected utility of imposing or sanctioning sentence s is the sum of the discounted present value of retaining office and the disutility of sentencing away from her ideal:
Differentiating with respect to s yields the following first order condition:
Second order conditions indicating a maximum follow from the concavity of the functions p(·) and ν(·). Next, we turn to comparative statics. We first consider the effect of changing the sensitivity of electoral response. From the implicit function theorem,
Suppose the effect of moving from a non-competitive to a competitive electoral system is an increased potential for adverse electoral consequences for leniency (the incentive account). The empirical implication of (1) is that, ceteris paribus, sentencing should be more punitive in partisan competitive districts than retention districts.
Second, we note the relationship between the judge's optimal sentence and her electorally unconstrained ideal sentence:
If judges in partisan competitive districts are inherently more punitive than those in retention districts (the selection account), the empirical implication of (2) is, again, that sentencing should be more punitive in the former than in the latter. In other words, a finding of greater punitiveness in partisan competitive systems than retention systems is compatible with both the incentive and selection accounts.
Third, we document the electoral proximity effect:
Other things being equal, sentencing should become more punitive as election approaches -whether or not observed differences in judicial behavior across electoral systems are generated by selection or incentives.
The interaction between the judge's sentencing preferences and electoral proximity is indicated by the cross-partial derivative:
While this expression seems quite complicated, it is always negative provided the third-order terms are sufficiently small (e.g. in the case of quadratic utility). 29 In other words, if judges in partisan competitive districts are more primitively punitive, then the electoral proximity effect should be smaller in the partisan districts than the retention districts.
The interaction between fire alarm sensitivity and electoral proximity is given by the crosspartial derivative: Provided the third-order terms are sufficiently small, the sign of (4) hinges on the quantity
Substituting (1) into (5) gives
Because this quantity is positive, for sufficiently small third-order terms the cross-partial ∂ 2 s * ∂q∂t is also positive. If judges in partisan competitive systems face stronger sanctions for lenient sentencing, then the electoral proximity effect should be larger in those districts than in retention districts -a prediction opposite from that of the selection account.
Note that the foregoing results assume that the choice of s * is not constrained from above.
Suppose instead that a judge's sentencing discretion was limited by a maximum sentence:
In that case, all of the above results weakly hold save the last one. If, for a given q = q , there exists a time t ≥ 0 such that s * (q = q , t = t ) =ŝ, then s * (q = q , t) =ŝ for all t ∈ [t , T ]. Because, for interior optimum sentences, ∂ 2 s * ∂q∂t > 0 and ∂s * ∂q > 0, for all q > q , t , the minimum value of t for which s * (q = q , t) =ŝ, is strictly less than t . Consequently, on [t , t ), ∂s * ∂t | q=q > 0, and ∂s * ∂t | q=q = 0. Ceteris paribus, judges in partisan competitive systems will be bound by statutory maximum sentences earlier in their terms than those in retention systems (if they are bound at all). Consequently, their assigned sentences will thereafter be unresponsive to changes in electoral proximity, even while the sentences of judges in retention systems continue to rise as election approaches.
Because prosecutors and defendants negotiate plea bargains in the shadow of the judge, who both has the power to reject them as well as to sentence given a conviction following a failure to reach an agreement, both negotiated pleas and sentencing at trial will reflect the judge's preferred sentence (LaCasse and Payne 1999) and be similarly responsive to changes in parameter values.
Appendix B. Derivation of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator
To operationalize proportionality in the statistical model, we adopt a reduced-form representation of the judge's optimal sentence, s * , discussed in Appendix A. Specifically, we assume the induced ideal punishment of judge j for convicted defendant i at time t is a multiplicative function of the defendant's culpability and the judge's punitiveness. Culpability c it ∈ R + refers to a set of circumstances or a fact pattern associated with the commission of a crime, including the criminal history of the defendant, the nature of the crime itself, and victim characteristics. Punitiveness, a ijt ∈ R + can emerge from several sources: judge-specific time invariant characteristics such as philosophy or ideology, the position of the judge in his or her electoral calendar, or any possibly discriminatory motivations associated with specific defendant characteristics.
The utility to judge j of sentence s for defendant i at time t is single-peaked and given 
In principle, β and γ could be estimated via least squares (although separate constant terms would not be identified), with a standard error adjustment to account for judge-specific groupwise heteroscedasticity. Two difficulties persist. First, statutory maximum sentences limit how long a sentence a judge can assign. In those cases, we treat the data as right-censored: the judge may have wanted to impose a larger sentence, but was unable to.
A more pervasive problem emerges because a sentence can consist of two components: the incarcerative portion, consisting of jail time, and a non-incarcerative portion, consisting of, for example, fines, probation, and community service. Difficulties emerge because we cannot place non-incarcerative terms on the same metric as jail or prison time, and because a majority of cases involve zero prison time.
We recast the scaling problem as a left-censoring problem by assuming that from the perspective of the defendant, the worst non-incarcerative sentence is preferable to the most lenient prison term. 30 Let γ be the most punitive sentence short of imprisonment. Representing the prison portion of sentence s * ijt as p ijt , the dependent variable becomes ln(p ijt + γ). As noted in the text, we set γ = 1, an assumption that implies one month in prison is exactly twice as painful as the maximum non-incarcerative sentence. Substituting values for γ between 0.1 and 10 has no influence on our substantive results. When a sentence involves zero prison time, it is left-censored at ln(1) = 0. The right-censoring implied by the statutory maximum sentences and the left-censoring implied by non-incarcerative sentences yields the two-limit Tobit likelihood function (with groupwise heteroscedasticity adjustment) in which the right-censoring point differs from observation to observation. 30 Given the felonies to which we restrict our attention, this is not particularly controversial. If this assumption were false, convicts would, when offered terms of probation, turn them down in favor of prison time. We know of no instance in which this has occurred. (1) and (2), 16,528 in columns (4) and (5), and 30 in columns (3) and (6). Dependent variable is Ln(1+assigned prison time in months). Standard errors in parentheses. Model specification in columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) is Tobit with groupwise (judge) heteroscedasticityconsistent standard errors. Coefficients for Crime and Year indicators are not reported. Results in columns (3) and (6) are for second-stage weighted-least squares regression described in text. 
